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Abstract This paper studies dynamic mechanism design in a quasilinear Markovian
environment and analyze a direct mechanism model of a principal-agent framework
in which the agent is allowed to exit at any period. We consider that the agent’s
private information, referred to as state, evolves over time. The agent makes decisions
of whether to stop or continue and what to report at each period. The principal, on
the other hand, chooses decision rules consisting of an allocation rule and a set of
payment rules to maximize her ex-ante expected payoff. In order to influence the
agent’s stopping decision, one of the terminal payment rules is posted-price, i.e., it
depends only on the realized stopping time of the agent. We define the incentive
compatibility in this dynamic environment in terms of Bellman equations, which is
then simplified by establishing a one-shot deviation principle.
Given the optimality of the stopping rule, a sufficient condition for incentive com-
patibility is obtained by constructing the state-dependent payment rules in terms of
a set of functions parameterized by the allocation rule. A necessary condition is de-
rived from envelope theorem, which explicitly formulates the state-dependent pay-
ment rules in terms of allocation rules. A class of monotone environment is con-
sidered to characterize the optimal stopping by a threshold rule. The posted-price
payment rules are then pinned down in terms of the allocation rule and the threshold
function up to a constant. The incentive compatibility constraints restrict the design
of the posted-price payment rule by a regular condition.
Keywords mechanism design · dynamic · principal-agent problem · optimal
stopping
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1 Introduction
Mechanism design theory provides a theoretical foundation for designing games that
can induce desired outcomes. The players of the game have private information that is
not publicly observable. Hence, the mechanism designer’s collective decisions have
to rely on the players to reveal their private information. This information asymmetry
and the corresponding incentive compatibility are important features of mechanism
design problems. The revelation principle allows the mechanism designer to focus on
a class of incentive-compatible direct mechanisms to replicate equilibrium outcomes
of indirect mechanisms. In the celebrated work by Vickery in 1961 Vickrey [1961],
it has been shown that the seller receives the same expected revenue independent of
the mechanism within a large class of auctions. Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism is an example of truthful mechanism to achieve a social-optimal solution. We
aim to investigate mechanism design problems in a dynamic environment, in which
a player, a.k.a., the agent, sends a sequence of messages based on the gathered infor-
mation to the designer. The designer, a.k.a., the principal, chooses a dynamic value
structure to maximize the profit based on the messages. We are particularly interested
in scenarios when the agent makes multiple payoff-relevant decisions over multiple
periods. Our task in this paper is to settle the design regimes to elicit the agent to
release his private information under the dynamic environment and to optimally re-
spond to such behavior.
Many real-world problems are fundamentally dynamic in nature. Research of dy-
namic mechanism design has studied many applications in optimal auctions (e.g.,
Eso˝ and Szentes [2007], Lin et al. [2010]), screening (e.g., Akan et al. [2015], Courty and Hao
[2000], Deb and Said [2015]), optimal taxation (e.g., Findeisen and Sachs [2016],
Makris and Pavan [2015]), contract design (e.g., Williams [2011], Zhang [2009]),
matchingmarket (e.g., Akbarpour et al. [2014], Anderson and Smith [2010]), to name
a few. In dynamic mechanism problems, there are mechanisms without private in-
formation. For example, in airline revenue management problems, an airline makes
decisions about seats pricing on a flight by taking into account the time-varying in-
ventory and the time-evolution of the customer base. In this paper, however, we con-
sider an information-asymmetric dynamic environment in which the agent privately
possesses information that evolves over time. The time evolution of the private in-
formation may be caused by external factors, the past observations, as well as the
decisions from the principal, as when the agent employs learning-by-doing regimes.
For example, in repeated sponsored search auctions, the advertisers privately learn
about the profitability of clicks on their ads based on evaluations of past ads as well
as observations from market analysis.
Optimal stopping theory studies the timing decisions under conditions of un-
certainty and has been successfully adopted in applications of economics, finance,
and engineering. Examples include gambling problems (e.g., Dubins and Sudderth
[1977], He et al. [2019]), option tradings (e.g., Ano [2009], Lamberton et al. [2009],
Lundgren and Silvestrov [2010]), and quick detection problems (e.g., Li et al. [2014],
Tartakovsky and Veeravalli [2008]). This paper studies a class of general dynamic
mechanism design models, in which the agent has the right to stop the mechanism
at any period based on his observations by current period and the anticipations of
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the entire future. The agent forms a stopping rule before the mechanism starts and is
allowed to realize the stopping time in any period before mechanism terminates natu-
rally upon reaching the final period. We consider a finite-horizon setting of a Marko-
vian environment, in which the agent can observe the private information, referred
to as state, that arrives at the beginning of each period. The dynamic information
structure is governed by a stochastic process that is characterized by the principal’s
decision rules and the transition kernels of the state’s dynamics. After observing his
state at each period, the agent chooses a strategy to report his state to the principal
and decides whether to stop immediately or to continue. Conditioning on the reported
information (including the stopping decision), the principal provides an allocation to
the agent and induces a payment. The principal aims to maximize her ex-ante ex-
pected payoff by choosing feasible decision rules including a set of allocation rules
and a set of payment rules. The principal provides three payment rules including an
intermediate payment that specifies a payment based on the report when the agent
decides to continue and two terminal payment rules, one of which is state-dependent.
The other terminal payment is posted-price in the sense that this payment rule de-
pends only on the realized stopping time, which enables the principal to influence the
agent’s stopping decision without taking into account the agent’s reporting strategy.
This state-independent terminal payment rule could be the early termination fee to
disincentivize the agent from early stopping (when the preferences of the principal
and the agent are not aligned); or it could be a reward to elicit the agent to stop at
certain periods before the final period to fulfill the principal’s own interests (when
the preferences of the principal and the agent are aligned or partially-aligned). Un-
der some monotone conditions, the optimal stopping rule can be reformulated to a
threshold rule with a time-dependent threshold function, which simplifies the princi-
pal’s design of the state-independent payment rule as well as the complexity of the
agent’s stopping decision.
The guarantee of incentive compatibility in the principal’s problem for the ratio-
nal agent’s decision making is an important research agenda in mechanism design.
As captured by the notion of implementability in mechanism design problems, the
concept of equilibrium from game theory illustrates that the rational agent’s truthful
behaviors align with the principal’s objectives. The design problem in this work faces
the challenges from the dependence of current-period decisions on the anticipated fu-
ture behaviors. Moreover, the stopping and the reporting decisions impact each other
through influencing and being influenced by the expected payoff evaluated at each pe-
riod. On one hand, by fixing a reporting strategy, the agent’s stopping decision (based
on the stopping rule) is made by comparing the payoff if he stops immediately and the
best expected payoff he can anticipate from the future. The stopping decision deter-
mines the effective time horizon of the expected payoff at each period. On the other
hand, with a fixed stopping decision, the reporting strategy is chosen by comparing
the expected payoffs of different reporting strategies, which determines the expected
instantaneous payoff at each period up to the effective time horizon pinned down by
the stopping decision. Hence, the stopping rule enters the characterization of incen-
tive compatibility through this dynamic interdependence. Given the mechanism, the
stopping and the reporting decisions together determine the agent’s optimal behav-
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iors. The coupling of these two decisions in the analysis of incentive compatibility
distinguishes this work from other dynamic mechanism design problems.
We define the incentive compatibility in terms of Bellman equations and address
the challege induced by the above dynamic multi-dimensional decision making by
establishing a one-shot deviation principal (e.g., Blackwell [1965]). One-shot devi-
ation principal has uncovered a foundation of optimality in game theory that if the
agent’s deviation from truthful reporting is not profitable for one period, then any
finite arbitrary deviations from truthfulness is not profitable. Monotonicity regarding
the designer’s allocation rules with respect to the agent’s private information is an im-
portant result for the implementability of mechanism design. Consider a single-good
auction in which the states are bidders’ valuations for a single good and the outcomes
are the probabilities for the agent to win the good. Here, the monotonicity refers to
that the probability to win the good is non-decreasing in the reported state (see, e.g.,
Berger et al. [2010], Myerson [1981]). Myerson [1981] has shown that monotonicity
is sufficient for implementability in a single dimensional domain. However, in gen-
eral monotonicity acts only as a necessary condition. Rochet [1987] has constructed
a necessary and sufficient condition, called cyclic monotonicity, under which one can
design a mechanism such that truthful reporting is optimal for the rational agent. In
this work, we describe a set of monotonicity conditions through inequalities char-
acterized by functions of the non-monetary allocation rules, which we call potential
functions. Given the optimality of the stopping rule, a sufficient condition of incentive
compatibility is obtained by constructing the state-dependent payment rules in terms
of potential functions. By applying the envelope theorem, we show a necessary con-
dition of incentive compatibility and formulate the potential functions in closed form
in terms of the allocation rule. The sufficient and the necessary conditions yield a
revenue equivalence property for the dynamic environment. We also show that given
the threshold function and the allocation rule, the state-independent payment rule is
unique up to a constant. Based on the threshold rule, we provide a design principle
for the state-independent payment rule by specifying a regular condition constructed
by the allocation rule and the threshold function. We observe that the posted-price
payments from the state-independent payment rule is restricted by a class of regular
condition.
1.1 Related Work
General settings regarding the source of dynamic in the related literature can be di-
vided into two categories. On one hand, the literature on dynamic mechanism de-
sign considers the dynamic population of participants with static private information.
Parkes and Singh [2004] have provided an elegant extension of the social-welfare-
maximizing (efficiency) VCG mechanism to an online mechanism design framework
that studies sequential allocation problems in a dynamic-population environment.
In particular, they have considered the setting when each self-interested agent ar-
rives and departs dynamically over time. The private information in their model in-
cludes the arrival and the departure time as well as the agent’s valuation about dif-
ferent outcomes. However, the agents do not learn new private information or update
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their private information. Pai and Vohra [2008] have proposed a dynamic mechanism
model of the similar setting but focusing on the profit-maximization (optimality) of
the designer. Other works focusing on this setting include, e.g., Board and Skrzypacz
[2016], Gallien [2006], Gershkov and Moldovanu [2009], Pai and Vohra [2013], Said
[2012], Vulcano et al. [2002]. On the other hand, there is a number of works study-
ing the problems of the static population where the underlying framework is dy-
namic because of the time-evolution of the private information. This category of
research has been pioneered by the work of Baron and Besanko [1984] on regula-
tion of a monopoly and the contributions of Courty and Hao [2000] on a sequen-
tial screening problem. There is a large amount of work in this category including,
for instance, the dynamic pivot mechanisms (e.g., Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [2010],
Kakade et al. [2013]) and dynamic team mechanisms (e.g., Athey and Segal [2013],
Bapna and Weber [2005], Nazerzadeh et al. [2013]). Pavan et al. [2014] have pro-
vided a general dynamic mechanism model in which the dynamic of the agents’
private information is captured by a set of kernels that is applicable for different be-
haviors of the time evolution including the learning-based and i.i.d. evolution. They
have used a Myersonian approach and designed a profit-maximizingmechanism with
monotonic allocation rules. Kakade et al. [2013] have studied a dynamic virtual-pivot
mechanism and provided conditions on the dynamics of the agents’ private informa-
tion. They have shown an optimal mechanism under the environment they call sepa-
rable. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [2010] and Parkes [2007] have provided surveys of
recent advances in dynamic mechanism design.
The challenges of both settings of dynamics described above come from the in-
formation asymmetry between the designer and the agents. Most of the mechanism
design problems study the direct revelation mechanism, in which guaranteeing the
incentive compatibility becomes essentially important. In many dynamic-population
mechanism problems with static private information, the incentive compatibility con-
straints are essentially static (Kakade et al. [2013]). The mechanisms with dynamic
private information, however, requires efforts to guarantee the incentive compati-
bility. Monotonicity is an important property of incentive compatible mechanism
design that is usually used in literature of dynamic mechanism design (see, e.g.,
Eso˝ and Szentes [2007], Kakade et al. [2013], Pavan et al. [2014]).
Many situations in economics can be modeled as stopping problems. There is lit-
erature on the mechanism design with stopping time. Kruse and Strack [2015] have
studied an optimal stopping problem for dynamic allocation, where the agent is free
to stop. They have considered that the agent privately observes a stochastic process,
which influences the payoffs of the agent as well as the principal for the entire time
horizon (i.e., before, at, and after the realized stopping time). Their model does not
rely on the direct mechanism and no incentive compatibility constraints are consid-
ered. Instead, they have focused on a posted-price mechanism (see, e.g., Hartline
[2001]) that has only a single monetary transfer that specifies the payment when the
agent stops. Pavan et al. [2009] have described an application of their dynamic mech-
anism approach to the optimal stopping problem, where the allocation rule provided
by the principal is the stopping rule. Basic formats of stopping rules have been sum-
marized in Lova´sz and Winkler [1995] and for rigorous mathematical formulations
of general stopping problems, see Peskir and Shiryaev [2006].
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1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the dynamic
environment and specify the notations. Section 3 formulates the dynamic principal-
agent problem and clarifies the necessary assumptions for the model. In Section 4, we
determine the optimal stopping rule for the agent and define the incentive compati-
bility constraints under the dynamic environment with the optimal stopping rule. We
also establish the one-shot deviation principle for the dynamic mechanism. Section
5 characterizes the incentive compatibility of the dynamic mechanism by presenting
the corresponding necessary and the sufficient conditions. We construct the payment
rules in terms of the allocation rule and establish the revenue equivalence. In Section
6, we show an example of profit-maximizing mechanism and apply a relaxation ap-
proach to obtain the optimal decision rules for the principal. Section 7 concludes the
work.
2 Dynamic Environment
There are two risk neutral participants in the mechanism: a principal (indexed by 0,
she) and an agent (indexed by 1, he). We consider a finite time horizon with discrete
time t ∈ T ≡ {1,2, . . . ,T}. Let Tt ≡ {t, t+ 1, . . . ,T}, for all t ∈ T. At each period t,
the agent observes the state θt ∈ Θt ≡ [θ t , θ¯t ] ⊂ R. Based on θt , the agent sends a
report θˆt ∈Θt to the principal. Let σt : Θt →Θt be the reporting strategy at t such
that θˆt = σt(θt) is the report sent to the principal. We say that the reporting strategy is
truthful if σt(θt) = θt for all t ∈ T and θt ∈Θt . Let Γ be the measurable set of the re-
porting strategy σ ≡ {σt}t∈T. Upon receiving the report θˆt , the principal specifies an
allocation at ∈At and a payment pt ∈R. Each At is a measurable space of all possible
allocations. The allocation and the payment are chosen, respectively, according to a
set of rules α and φ , where α ≡ {αt}t∈T is a collection of (instantaneous) allocation
rules αt : Θt → At and φ ≡ {φt}t∈T is a collection of (instantaneous) payment rules
φt : Θt → R, such that the principal chooses at = αt (θˆt) and pt = φt (θˆt) when θˆt is
reported.
The mechanism allows the agent to quit the mechanism at any period t ∈ T by
choosing a stopping time τ ∈ T according to his optimal stopping rule. We assume
that the agent’s preference for stopping rule is common knowledge. Hence, the prin-
cipal’s decision rules have to address any profitable deviations from truthful reporting
due to the agent’s stopping rule in the characterization of incentive compatibility. In
order to influence the agent’s decision of stopping time, the principal offers a termi-
nal transfer ρ : T→ R, with ρ(T ) = 0, which depends only on the realized stopping
time τ chosen by the agent, such that the agent receives an additional monetary trans-
fer ρ(τ). To distinguish the intermediate periods and the terminal period, let ξt ≡ φt
when the agent realizes his stopping time at period t.
The mechanism is information-asymmetric because θt is privately possessed by
the agent for every t ∈ T and the principal can learn the true state only through the
report θˆt . The mechanism is dynamic because the state θt evolves over time and
participants’ decisions are made dynamically. The dynamics of the state evolution in-
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duces dynamics of probability measures over time. Therefore, the expectations of the
future takes at different periods are in general different from each other. In the follow-
ing subsection, we define the time-evolution of the state and describe the stochastic
process that governs the dynamics of state generations.
2.1 Markovian Dynamics
We consider when the state evolves over time in a Markovian environment described
in the following precise sense. As conventions, let x˜ represent the random variable
such that x is a realized sample of x˜. By hxs,t ≡ {xs, ...xt}, we denote the history of xt
(x ∈ {θ , θˆ ,a,α}) from period s up to t (including t), with hxt ≡ h
x
1,t , h
x
t,t ≡ h
x
t,t−1 ≡ xt ,
for all t ∈ T. Let Hxs,t represent the set of history h
x
s,t .
Definition 1 (Markovian Dynamics) Let Kt :Θt−1×At−1 → ∆(Θt) be the transition
kernel at period t and let Ft(·|θt−1,at−1) be the differentiable cumulative distribution
function (c.d.f.) of θ˜t , with ft (·|θt−1,at−1) as the density function, corresponding to
the kernel Kt(θt−1,at−1) with F1 is given at the initial period t = 1.
Given the current period state θt , the expected next period state θt+1 depends on
θt and the current allocation at . Hence, the Markovian dynamics of the mechanism
can be characterized by the allocation rule α and the transition kernel K. Ionescu-
Tulcea theorem shows that given a set of kernels K ≡ {Kt}t∈T, the allocation rule
α ≡ {αt}t∈T uniquely defines a stochastic process Ξα overΘ ≡{Θt}t∈T that governs
the time evolution of the state from t = 1 to T , following which we define the interim
process.
Definition 2 (Interim Process) The interim process Ξα
[
hθt
]
at period t ∈ T consists
of
(i) a deterministic process of the realized hθt ∈ H
θ
t up to time t, and
(ii) a stochastic process starting from t+ 1 that is uniquely characterized by θt , at ,
the allocation rule αTt+1 ≡ {αs}
T
s=t+1, and the kernels K
T
t ≡ {Ks}
T
s=t+1.
Let σ ∈ Γ be any reporting strategy of the agent. Here, each σt enters the time
evolution of the states through the allocation rule at =αt(σt (θt)), for all t ∈T. Define
Ξα ;σ and Ξα ;σ [h
θ
t ], respectively, the stochastic process and the interim process when
the agent adopts reporting strategy σ , with Ξα ;σ ≡ Ξα and Ξα ;σ [h
θ
t ]≡ Ξα [h
θ
t ] when
the agent reports (and plans to report) truthfully for all t ∈ T. The timing of the
mechanism is described as follows.
I. Ex-ante stage: before the agent participates. At this stage, the randomness of the
future is characterized by Ξα ,σ .
II. Interim stage: after state θt is generated at period t ∈ T according to the Markov
dynamics in Definition 1. At each interim stage:
1. The agent observes θt , chooses a report θˆt = σt(θt), and decides whether to
stop immediately or continue to the next period.
2. Upon receiving θˆt , the principal chooses an allocation at = αt (θˆt), a payment
pt = φt(θˆt ), and a terminal transfer ρ(t) if the agent stops at t.
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At each interim stage, the randomness of the future is characterized by Ξα ,σ
[
hθt
]
.
III. Ex post stage: after the mechanism terminated, i.e., state is observed and reported,
the stopping time is realized or period T is reached, and allocation and payments
are delivered. There is no randomness of the future at this stage.
3 Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem
In this section, we first describe the principal-agent problem by identifying their re-
spective objectives. Let ui,t : Θt ×At denote the (instantaneous) utility of the partic-
ipant i for i ∈ {0,1} such that ui,t(θt ,at) is the utility that the participant i receives
when the true state is θt and the allocation is at for all t ∈ T. Given any time horizon
τ ∈ T and reporting strategies σ ≡ {σt}
τ
t=0, define the ex-ante expected values of the
principal and the agent, respectively, for any time horizon τ ∈ T,
Z
α ,φ ,ξ
0 (τ;σ)≡ E
Ξα;σ
[
δ τ
[
u0,τ(θ˜τ ,ατ (στ(θ˜τ )))− ξτ(στ (θ˜τ ))
]
+
τ−1
∑
t=1
δ t
[
u0,t(θ˜t ,αt(σt(θ˜t )))−φt(σt(θ˜t ))
]]
,
and
Z
α ,φ ,ξ
1 (τ;σ) ≡ E
Ξα;σ
[
δ τ
[
u1,τ(θ˜t ,ατ (στ(θ˜τ ))+ ξτ(στ (θ˜τ)
]
+
τ−1
∑
t=1
δ t
[
u1,t(θ˜t ,αt(σt(θ˜t )))+φt(σt(θ˜t ))
]]
,
where δ ∈ (0,1] is the discount factor. Let J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
0 :T×Γ 7→R and J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 :T×Γ 7→
R denote the ex-ante expected payoffs of the principal and the agent, respectively,
given as follows:
Principal:
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
0 (τ;σ) ≡Z
α ,φ ,ξ
0 (τ;σ)−ρ(τ); (1)
Agent:
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (τ;σ) ≡Z
α ,φ ,ξ
1 (τ;σ)+ρ(τ). (2)
Fix any time horizon τ ∈T, we define the interim expected value function of the agent
evaluated at period t when θt is observed, θˆt is reported at t, as
Z
α ,φ ,ξ
1,t (τ,θt ,σt(θt);σ |h
θ
t−1)
≡EΞα;σ [h
θ
t−1,θt ,σt(θt)]
[
δ τ
[
u1,τ(θ˜τ ,ατ (στ (θ˜τ)))+ ξτ(στ(θ˜τ )))
]
+
τ−1
∑
t=1
δ t
[
u1,t(θ˜t ,αt(σt (θ˜t))+φt(σt(θ˜t ))
]]
,
(3)
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with Z
α ,φ ,ξt
1,t (τ,θt |h
θ
t−1) ≡ Z
α ,φ ,ξt
1,t (τ,θt ,σt(θt );σ |h
θ
t−1) when σ is truthful. Then, we
can define the corresponding interim expected payoff of the agent at period t as, for
any reporting strategy σ , any time horizon τ ∈ T,
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ,θt ,σt(θt );σ |h
θ
t−1) = Z
α ,φ ,ξ
1,t (τ,θt ,σt(θt);σ |h
θ
t−1)+ρ(τ), (4)
with J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ,θt |h
θ
t−1)≡ J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ,θt ,σt(θt);σ |h
θ
t−1) when σ is truthful.
At the ex-ante stage, the principal provides a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent
by taking into account the agent’s stopping rule. Based on the offer and his own
stopping rule, the agent decides whether to accept the offer or not. The principal’s
mechanism design problem is to maximize her ex-ante expected payoff (1) (i.e., profit
maximizing or optimal mechanism), given the agent’s stopping rule, by choosing the
decision rules {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ} such that the mechanism satisfies the incentive compatibil-
ity and rational participation constraints, which will be elaborated in later sections.
Upon receiving the offer, the agent, on the other hand, decides how to report his
state at each period in order to maximize his interim expected payoff (4) and decides
whether to realize the stopping time according to his stopping rule. At each period t,
the agent’s incentive of reporting truthfully depends on the current instantaneous pay-
off as well as the expected future payoffs. Since the agent knows the time evolution
of the mechanism, he can determine his current reporting strategy and plan his future
behaviors. Suppose at period t, θt is realized. The current report θˆt = σt(θt) changes
the period-t allocation at = αt(θˆt ). Since at enters the kernel Kt+1(θt ,at), the report
θˆt also changes the distribution of all future states. Similarly, at period t, the agent can
plan each future reporting strategy σt′ , t
′ ∈ Tt , by taking into account the influence of
σt′ on the distribution of the states from period t
′+1 onward. As a result, the analysis
of the principal’s decision rules from each period needs to be coupled with all the
agent’s reporting strategies from period-t onward and the corresponding complexity
has to be well addressed for the incentive compatibility constraints.
Analysis of optimal dynamic mechanism design requires the expectations eval-
uated at each period t ∈ T to be well-behaved as the agent’s private state evolves
dynamically over time. We impose the following standing assumptions by fixing the
decision rules {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ}. All the following standing assumptions hold throughout
the paper. Note that all the norms denoted by ‖ · ‖ are Euclidean norm.
Assumption 1. The probability density ft (θt)> 0 for all θt ∈Θt , t ∈ T.
Assumption 2. For all, θ ′t ≥ θt ∈Θt , θ¯t+1 ∈Θt+1, t ∈ [0,T ),
Ft+1(θ¯t+1|θ
′
t ,αt(θ
′
t ))≤ Ft+1(θ¯t+1|θt ,αt(θt)). (5)
Assumption 3. The instantaneous utility u1,t is differentiable of θt and is Lipschitz
continuous on all finite θt ∈Θt , for all t ∈ T.
Assumption 4. The difference given by
χ
α ,φ ,ξ
1,t (θt)≡ Z
α ,φ ,ξ
1,t (t+ 1,θt |h
θ
t−1)−Z
α ,φ ,ξ
1,t (t,θt |h
θ
t−1), (6)
is non-decreasing in θt for all t ∈ T.
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Assumption 5. For all θt ∈Θt , t ∈ T,
E
α |θt
[
sup
τ∈Tt
|J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ,θt |h
θ
t−1)|
]
< ∞. (7)
Assumption 1 states that the state realized at each period is fully supported. As-
sumption 2 states that the process of the state behaves in a way characterized by
first-order stochastic dominance. Assumption 3 is important for the formulation of
the first-order necessary condition based on envelope theorem. Assumption 4 allows
us to establish the monotonicity of the stopping rule, where χ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (θt) is the differ-
ence between the interim expected values of period t and t+ 1 evaluated at period t.
The boundedness in Assumption 5 is important in the existance of optimal stopping
time and the formulation of incentive compatibility.
4 Optimal Stopping Rule
In this section, we construct the optimal stopping rule for the agent and identify the
dynamic incentive compatibility constraints. We restrict our attention on the direct
mechanism (Fudenberg and Tirole [1991]), in which the agent reports truthfully, i.e.,
σt(θt) = θt for all t ∈ T. The importance of direct mechanism is due to the revelation
principle, which states that if the decision rules {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ} that can be implemented
by an indirect mechanism can be also implemented by a direct revelation mechanism
(see, e.g., Jackson [2009], Myerson [1981]).
Fix a truthful reporting strategy σ∗. The optimality of a stopping rule is defined
as follows.
Definition 3 Given {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ}, the agent’s stopping rule is said to be optimal if
there exists a τ∗ such that
sup
τ∈T
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (τ) = J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (τ
∗). (8)
We say that the stopping rule is implementable by the decision rules {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ} if
τ∗ solves (8).
To solve the optimal stopping problem (8), we define the agent’s value function
at period t as, for all θt ∈Θt , t ∈ T,
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt)≡ sup
τ∈Tt
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ,θt |h
θ
t−1), (9)
where the supremum is taken over all time horizon τ of the process Ξα [h
θ
t ] starting
from t. Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Applying backward induction leads to the
following Bellman equation representation of the value function.
For t ∈ T\{T},
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ) =max
(
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt |h
θ
t−1), E
Ξα [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
])
; (10)
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for t = T ,
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt) = J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,T (T,θT |h
θ
t−1). (11)
Define the stopping region, for all t ∈ T,
Λ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t)≡ {θt ∈Θt :V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (θt) = J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt |h
θ
t−1)}. (12)
Hence, we obtain the following stopping time corresponding to the Bellman equation
(10) as,
τt ≡ inf{t ∈ T : θt ∈Λ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t)}. (13)
Theorem 1.9 of Peskir and Shiryaev [2006] has shown that the stopping time τt is op-
timal; i.e., τt solves (9) for all θt ∈Θt , t ∈T. Since J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (τ
∗) =EF1
[
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,1 (θ˜1)
]
,
the stopping rule characterized by (13) at each t also solves (8). Interested readers
may refer to Chapter 1 of Peskir and Shiryaev [2006] for a rigorous characterization
of general optimal stopping for Markovian processes.
With a slight abuse of notation, define the value function at period t given any
reporting strategy σ = {σt}t∈T, asV
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ;σ). The incentive compatibility of the
dynamic mechanism with optimal stopping rule is precisely defined in the following.
Definition 4 The dynamic mechanism {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ} with optimal stopping rule is in-
centive compatible (IC) if, for all reporting strategy σ , and
(1) for t ∈ T\{T},
max
(
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt |h
θ
t−1), E
Ξα [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
])
≥max
(
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt ,σt(θt);σ |h
θ
t−1), E
Ξα;σ [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
])
;
(14)
(2) for t = T ,
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,T (T,θT |h
θ
t−1)≥ J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,T (T,θT ,σT (θT );σ |h
θ
t−1). (15)
i.e., the agent of state θt maximizes his value at period t by reporting truthfully at
all t ∈ T. The allocation rule α is called implementable if there exists payment rules
{φ ,ξ ,ρ} that makes the mechanism incentive compatible.
At the final period t = T , the agent stops with probability 1. His incentive to
misreport the true state is captured by the immediate instantaneous payoff. The in-
equality (15) guarantees the non-profitability of misreporting and thus disincentivizes
the agent from untruthful reporting. At each non-final period t, agent’s exploration of
profitable deviations from truthful reporting strategy takes into account the misre-
porting of the current state as well as any possible planned future misreporting. In
particular, when the agent’s optimal stopping rule calls for stopping if he reports
truthfully,Vα ,φ ,ξ ,ρ(θt ) = J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt |h
θ
t−1); when the agent’s optimal stopping rule
calls for continuing if he reports truthfully, Vα ,φ ,ξ ,ρ(θt) = E
Ξα [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
.
Misreporting could result in three situations: (1) : misreporting at t and stopping at t,
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(2) : misreporting at t, planned misreporting in the future, and continuing, (3) : truth-
ful reporting at t, planned misreporting in the future, and continuing. Basically, the
inequality (14) ensures that no such deviations from truthfully reporting is profitable.
Let σˆ be any reporting strategy that differs from truthful reporting strategy σ∗
in only one period t ∈ T. We call the adoption of σˆ as one-shot deviation at t, for
any period t ∈ T. For simplicity, let α|xt , xˆt ≡ Ξα ;σˆ [h
θ
t ] and J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (θt , θˆt |h
θ
t−1) ≡
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (θt , θˆt ; σˆ |h
θ
t−1) when the true state is θt and agent’s σˆ reports θˆt = σˆt(θt ) at t.
We establish the one-shot deviation principle for our dynamic mechanism in Lemma
1.
Lemma 1 The mechanism {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ} with optimal stopping rule is IC if and only
if there is no profitable one-shot deviation for any period t ∈ T, i.e.,
(i) for t ∈ T\{T},
max
(
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt |h
θ
t−1), E
Ξα [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
])
≥max
(
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt , θˆt |h
θ
t−1), E
α |θt ,θˆt
[
V
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
])
,
(16)
(ii) for t = T ,
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,T (T,θT |h
θ
t−1)≥ J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,T (T,θT , θˆT |h
θ
t−1). (17)
Proof. See Appendix A.
This one-shot principle enables us to reduce the complexity of the dynamicmech-
anism model and allows the analysis at each period t to focus only on the agent’s
incentive compatibility at the current period. Hence, the IC constraints (14) and (15)
for any arbitrary deviations can be relaxed to one-shot deviation at each period t ∈ T,
i.e., (16) and (17). In the rest of the paper, we focus on the one-shot deviation strat-
egy σˆ that reports θˆt = σˆt(θt ) at any period t ∈ T and reports truthfully for all other
periods.
Define the continuing value as
µ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt , θˆt)≡ sup
τ∈Tt+1
E
α |θt ,θˆt
[
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t+1 (τ, θ˜t+1|h
θ
t )
]
−J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt , θˆt |h
θ
t−1), (18)
with µ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ,θt) ≡ µ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ). Then, the equality condition in the stopping re-
gion (12) is equivalent to µ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ) ≤ 0. Define the marginal value as, for all
t ∈ T\{T},
L
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt , θˆt)≡ E
α |θt ,θˆt
[
δ t+1
[
u1,t+1(θ˜t+1,αt+1(θ˜t+1))+ ξt+1(θ˜t+1)
]
+ρ(t+ 1)
]
+ δ t
[
φt(θˆt )− ξt(θˆt )
]
,
(19)
with L
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ,θt) = L
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ). Then L
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt)− ρ(t) captures the expected
change in the interim expected payoffs evaluated at t if the agent stops at period t+1
instead of stopping at t when θt is observed. We have the following two lemmas
regarding L
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t .
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Lemma 2 Given any time horizon τ ∈ T, we have
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (τ) = E
Ξα
[ τ−1
∑
s=1
Lα ,φ ,ξ ,ρs (θ˜s)−ρ(s)
]
+ J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (0), (20)
and
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ,θt |h
θ
t−1) =E
α |θt
[ τ−1
∑
s=t
Lα ,φ ,ξ ,ρs (θ˜s)−ρ(s)
]
+ J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt |h
θ
t−1). (21)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Then, L
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt) is non-decreasing in
θt , for all t ∈ T\{T}.
The proof of Lemma 3 directly follows the formulation of J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 shows that the agent’s ex-ante expected payoff and period-t interim ex-
pected payoff can be represented in terms of Lα ,φ ,ξ ,ρ , ρ , and the corresponding ex-
pected payoffs if the agent stops at the starting periods (i.e., period 0 or period t).
Lemma 3 establishes the single crossing condition that is necessary for the existence
of the threshold-based stopping rule that will be introduced later.
Define, for all t ∈ T\{T},
µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt , θˆt)≡ sup
τ∈Tt+1
[
E
α |θt ,θˆt
[ τ−1
∑
s=t+1
Lα ,φ ,ξ ,ρs (θ˜s)−ρ(s)
]]
+L
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt , θˆt),
(22)
with µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ,θt) ≡ µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ). We have the following lemma that directly fol-
lows Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 4 hold. µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt) is non-decreasing of
θt , for all t ∈ T\{T}.
By following Lemma 2, we can represent the continuing value as µ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt) =
µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt)−ρ(t). Hence, we rewrite the stopping region Λ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (12) as
Λ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t) = {θt ∈Θt : µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt )≤ ρ(t)}. (23)
Hence, the principal can adjust ρ(t) to influence the agent’s stopping time by chang-
ing the stopping region Λ
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t) in (23).
Next, we introduce a class of threshold-based stopping rule (see, e.g., Jacka and Lynn
[1992], Kruse and Strack [2018], Villeneuve [2007]) that is optimal as characterized
in (13). Let η : T→Θt be the threshold function, for all t ∈ T such that the agent
chooses to stop the first time the state θt ≥ η(t). Since the agent has to stop at the
final period, we require η(T ) = θ¯T . The threshold rule is defined as follows.
Definition 5 We say a stopping rule τ is a threshold rule if there exists an associated
threshold function η such that
τ = inf{t ∈ T|θt ≤ η(t)}. (24)
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Lemma 5 shows the uniqueness of the threshold function.
Lemma 5 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, each threshold rule has a unique
threshold function η(t).
Proof. See Appendix C.
The following lemma shows that the threshold rule is implementable.
Lemma 6 If the stopping rule is implementable by {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ}, then it is a threshold
rule.
Proof. See Appendix D.
From (24), the state-independent ρ can be fully characterized by the threshold
function η such that the principal can influence the agent’s stopping time by manip-
ulating η . For example, setting η(t) = θ t (resp. ηt = θ¯t ) forces the agent to continue
(resp. stop) with probability 1.
4.1 Incentive Compatibility
In this subsection, we reformulate the incentive compatibility constraints (16) and
(17) in terms of the decision rules. Define the auxiliary functions
U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
S,t (θt , θˆt |h
θ
t−1)≡ δ
t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt (θˆt))+ ξt(θˆt)
]
+ρ(t), (25)
and
U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
S¯,t
(θt , θˆt |h
θ
t−1)≡ δ
t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt(θˆt ))+ ξt(θˆt)
]
+ µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt , θˆt ), (26)
with U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
j,t (θt ,θt |h
θ
t−1) ≡U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
S,t (θt |h
θ
t−1), for j = S, S¯. The subscripts S and S¯,
respectively, represent “stop” and “non-stop”.
Lemma 7 The IC constraints (16) and (17) are equivalent to the following
U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
S,t (θt |h
θ
t−1)≥U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
S,t (θt , θˆt |h
θ
t−1), (27)
and
U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
S¯,t
(θt |h
θ
t−1)≥U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
S¯,t
(θt , θˆt |h
θ
t−1), (28)
for all θt , θˆt ∈Θt , t ∈ T.
The conditions (27) and (28) reformulate the incentive constraints in (16) and
(17). They ensure that misreporting is not profitable in the instantaneous payoff when
the agent stops and continues, respectively. If (27) (resp. (28)) is satisfied, the opti-
mality of the stopping rule guarantees that continuing (resp. stopping) is not profitable
when the stopping rule calls for stopping (resp. continuing).
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5 Characterization of Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we characterize the incentive compatibility of the dynamic mecha-
nism. We first introduce the length functions and potential functions and show a suf-
ficient condition by constructing the payment rules in terms of the potential functions
based on the relationship between the length and the potential functions. Second, we
determine the necessary condition for incentive compatibility by applying the enve-
lope theorem and pin down the payment rules in terms of the allocation rule.
Define the length function as, for any θt , θˆt ∈Θt , t ∈ T,
ℓS,t(θˆt ,θt)≡ δ
tu1,t(θˆt ,αt(θˆt ))− δ
tu1,t(θt ,αt (θˆt)), (29)
and, for any τ ∈ Tt ,
ℓS¯,t(θˆt ,θt ;τ) =E
α |θˆt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))
]
+ δ τ ξτ(θ˜τ )
]
−Eα |θt ,θˆt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))
]
+ δ τ ξτ(θ˜τ)
]
,
(30)
such that ℓS,t(θˆt ,θt) and ℓS¯,t(θˆt ,θt ), respectively, represent the length from θt to θˆt ,
while the agent keeps reporting θˆt for both states when the agent stops at t and con-
tinues to the anticipated period τ . Let β αS,t(·) : Θt → R and β
α
S¯,t
(·) : Θt → R be the
potential functions that depend on only α . Proposition 1 shows the constructions of
the payment rules φ and ξ in terms of the potential functions and the relationships
between the length function and the potential functions that show the sufficiency for
the incentive compatibility. The explicit formulations of the potential functions are
obtained by determining a necessary condition shown later in Proposition 3.
Proposition 1 Fix an allocation rule α . Construct the payment rules φ and ξ as, for
all t ∈ T,
φt(θt) =δ
−tβ α
S¯,t
(θt)− δ
−t
E
α |θt
[
β α
S¯,t+1
(θ˜t+1)
]
− u1,t(θt ,αt (θt)), (31)
ξt(θt) = δ
−1β αS,t(θt )− u1,t(θt ,αt(θt )). (32)
The dynamic mechanism is incentive compatible if β α
S¯,t
and β αS,t satisfy for all θt ,
θˆt ∈Θt ,
β αS,t(θˆt)−β
α
S,t(θt)≤ ℓ
α ;θˆt ,θt
S,t (θˆt ,θt), (33)
β α
S¯,t
(θˆt)−β
α
S¯,t
(θt)≤ sup
τ∈Tt
{
ℓα ;θˆt ,θt
S¯,t
(θˆt ,θt ;τ)
}
, (34)
β α
S¯,t
(θt)≥ β
α
S,t(θt), with β
α
S¯,T
(θT ) = β
α
S,T (θT ). (35)
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Proof. See Appendix F.
Since the payment rule ρ is independent of the state, the incentive compatibility
constraints do not impose restrictions on ρ . The responsibility of ρ is to guarantee
the optimality of the stopping rule. Specifically, by setting ρ(t) = µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (η(t)), the
corresponding stopping rule is optimal with η as the threshold function. By substi-
tuting φt and ξt constructed as (31) and (32), respectively, in µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t , we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Fix an allocation rule α . The threshold rule with η is implementable
by {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ}, where φt and ξt are constructed in (31) and (32), respectively, and ρ
satisfies the following regular condition:
ρ(t) = β α
S¯,t
(η(t))−β αS,t(η(t))− sup
τ∈Tt+1
E
α |η(t)
[
β α
S¯,τ
(θ˜τ)−β
α
S,τ(θ˜τ )−ρ(τ)
]
. (36)
For each threshold function η , we can apply backward induction to pin down ρ(t)
in terms of β αS,t and β
α
S¯,t
for each t from (36) given ρ(T ) = 0.
Define with a slight abuse of notation
µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (τ,θt )≡ E
α |θt ,θˆt
[ τ−1
∑
s=t
Lα ,φ ,ξ ,ρs (θ˜s)−ρ(s)
]
+ρ(t),
and define
U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (τ,θt |h
θ
t−1)≡
{
δ t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt(θˆt))+ ξt(θˆt)
]
+ρ(t), if τ = t,
δ t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt(θˆt))+ ξt(θˆt)
]
+ µ¯
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ;τ), if τ > t.
(37)
The following lemma takes advantage of the quasilinearity of the payoff function and
formulates the partial derivative ofU
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (τ,θt |h
θ
t−1) with respect to θt by applying
the envelope theorem.
Lemma 8 Define Tst ≡ {t, . . . ,s}, T
k
t,s ≡ {{t1, . . . tk} ∈
(
T
s
t
)k
: t ≤ t1 < · · ·< tk ≤ s} ,
for all 1≤ k ≤ s− t+ 1, t < s, t, s ∈ T. For all θt ∈Θ , t ∈ T, τ ∈ Tt , we have
∂U
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (τ,r|h
θ
t−1)
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θt
=Eα |θt
[ τ
∑
s=t
∂u1,s(r,αs(θ˜s))
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θ˜s
Gt,s(h
θ˜
t,s)
]
, (38)
where
Gt,s(h
θ
t,s) =− ∑
1≤k≤s−t+1
{t1,...,tk}∈T
k
t,s
k
∏
i=1
∂Fti+1(θti+1 |θti+1−1,αti+1−1(θti+1−1))/dr
fti (θti |θti−1,αti−1(θti−1))
∣∣∣
r=θti
.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Proposition 3 shows a necessary condition for the incentive compatibility of the
dynamic mechanism, which is derived from the result in Lemma 8.
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Proposition 3 Let α[θˆt ] be the allocation rule one-shot deviation from α that reports
θˆt = αt(θ
′
t ) for all θ
′
t ∈Θt , t ∈ T, and reports truthfully for all other periods. In any
mechanism {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ} that implements the optimal stopping rule, βS¯,t and βS,t that
construct {φ ,ξ ,ρ} satisfy, for any arbitrary fixed states θε,t ∈Θ , any θ
′
t ∈Θt , t ∈ T,
– θt ≤ η(t):
β αS,t(θt) =
∫ θt
θε,t
γαt (t,r|h
θ
t−1)dr, (39)
– θt ≥ η(t):
β α
S¯,t
(θt ) = sup
τ∈Tt
{∫ θt
θε,t
γαt (τ,r|h
θ
t−1)dr
}
, (40)
where γαt (τ,θt |h
θ
t−1)≡
∂U
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (τ,r|h
θ
t−1)
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θt
.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Proposition 3 uses the result of Lemma 8 and provides the necessary conditions
of the incentive compatibility by constructing the potential functions in (39) and (40)
that depend only on the allocation rule α , up to a constant shift (determined by θε,t ).
Hence, givenα , the payment rules φ , ξ , and ρ are pinned down up to a constant. Such
formulations lead to the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem, which is an impor-
tant result in mechanism design problem in static settings (e.g., Myerson [1981],
Vickrey [1961]) as well as in dynamic environments (e.g., Kruse and Strack [2018],
Pavan et al. [2014] ). We summarize the revenue equivalence feature of the dynamic
mechanism with optimal stopping rule in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Fix an allocation rule α . Let β α ;ax,t and β
α ;b
x,t be potential functions
constructed in Proposition 3, for x= {S¯,S}, all t ∈ T, given any two arbitrary states
θ aε,t , θ
b
ε,t ∈Θ . Let φ
a ≡ {φat } and φ
b ≡ {φbt } be two payment rules constructed by
β α ;a
S¯,t
and β α ;b
S¯,t
, respectively, in Proposition 1. Define ξ a and ξ b, and ρa and ρb in
the similar way, for some threshold functions ηa and ηb. Then, there exist constants
{Cτ}τ∈T such that, for any t ∈ [0,τ], τ ∈ T,
E
α |θt
[ τ
∑
s=1
δ sφas (θ˜s)+ δ
τξ aτ (θ˜τ)+ρ
a(τ)
]
= Eα |θt
[ τ
∑
s=1
δ sφbs (θ˜s)+ δ
τ ξ bτ (θ˜τ )+ρ
b(τ)
]
+Cτ .
(41)
Proof. See Appendix G.
The revenue equivalence in Proposition 4 implies that different mechanisms char-
acterized by different allocation rules α result in equivalent expected costs of the prin-
cipal up to a constant for each time horizon τ ∈ T. The following proposition shows
the uniqueness of the state-independent payment rule ρ for each threshold function
η .
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Proposition 5 Fix an allocation rule α . Let β α ;ax,t and β
α ;b
x,t be potential functions
constructed in Proposition 3, for x= {S¯,S}, all t ∈ T, given any two arbitrary states
θ aε,t , θ
b
ε,t ∈Θ . Let η be any threshold function such that η(t) ∈Θt , for each t ∈ T.
Let ρa and ρb be two state-independent payment rules constructed by the same η in
Proposition 2 through β α ;ax,t and β
α ;b
x,t , respectively, for x = {S¯,S}. Then, there exist
constants {C
ρ
t }t∈T such that, for any t ∈ T,
ρa(t) = ρb(t)+C
ρ
t , (42)
with ρa(T ) = ρb(T ) =C
ρ
t = 0.
Fix an allocation rule α . From the formulations of potential functions in Propo-
sition 3, the payment rule ρ given in (36) can be designed by the choice of η such
that at each period t ∈ T, every η(t) ∈Θt has a corresponding ρ(t) that implements
the optimal stopping rule (13). However, the principal is not omnipotent in the sense
that in general she cannot freely post any value for ρ(t) from R, for all t ∈ T. Let
r ≡ {r1, . . . ,rT } ∈R
T be any sequence of real values. Define
R˚ ≡{r ∈ RT : β α
S¯,t(θt )−β
α
S,t(θt)− rt
= sup
τ∈Tt+1
E
α |θt
[
β α
S¯,τ (θ˜τ)−β
α
S,τ(θ˜τ )− rτ
]
, for all θt ∈Θt , t ∈ T}.
(43)
Hence, R˚ is the set of posted-price payment sequence ρ can choose from such that
there exists a threshold function η for each payment sequence.
Corollary 1 Fix an allocation rule α that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 1
and 3, respectively. Suppose Assumption 4 holds and let η be a threshold function.
Suppose ρ gives a sequence of posted-price payments r = {rt , . . . ,rT }, where rt =
ρ(t), t ∈ T. Then, the following statements hold.
(i) ρ with α implements the optimal stopping rule (13) if and only if r ∈ R˚.
(ii) Let r ∈ R˚. Let r′ differ from r in arbitrary periods, such that for some t, r′t = rt+εt ,
for some non-zero εt ∈ R. Suppose r
′ 6∈ R˚ due to these r′t ’s. Then, posting r
′ may
fail the incentive compatibility constraints.
(iii) Let φ and ξ be constructed in Proposition 1. If the mechanism does not involve
ρ , then {α,φ ,ξ} is incentive compatible if and only if there exists θt ∈Θt such
that, for all t ∈ T,
β α
S¯,t
(θt)−β
α
S,t(θt) = sup
τ∈Tt+1
E
α |θt
[
β α
S¯,τ
(θ˜τ )−β
α
S,τ(θ˜τ)
]
, (44)
where β α
S¯,t
and β αS,t(θt) are given in Proposition 3.
6 Optimal Mechanism and Relaxation
The principal’s mechanism design problem is to maximize her ex-ante expected pay-
off (1) by choosing the decision rules {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ}. The time horizon of the principal’s
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 19
ex-ante expected payoff is called the mean first passage time, denoted as τ¯ . Given the
agent’s optimal stopping rule, τ¯ is determined by {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ} and the choice of η .
From Proposition 1 and 2, φ and ξ can be represented by α , and ρ can be determined
by α and η . Define the mapping λ from the allocation rules and threshold function
to the mean first passage time, i.e.,
τ¯ = λ (α,η ;Ξα). (45)
At the ex-ante stage, the principal provides a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent.
The agent decides whether to participate at the ex-ante stage. Becides the incentive
compatibility constraints shown in Lemma 7, the mechanism also requires a class of
rational participation (RP) constraint as
RP: J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (τ¯)≥ 0, (46)
i.e., the anticipated ex-ante expected payoff of the agent by using the optimal stop-
ping rule is non-negative. Since the decision making at the ex-ante stage involves no
private information, the principal’s τ¯ coincides with the agent’s.
We relax the original mechanism problem by applying a class of relaxation ap-
proach (e.g., Deb et al. [2008], Eso˝ and Szentes [2007], Kakade et al. [2013], Pavan et al.
[2014]), in which the principal optimizes her objective function given the necessary
conditions for the incentive compatibility described in Proposition 3. In particular,
substituting the constructions of φ , ξ , and ρ in terms of the potential functions formu-
lated in Proposition 3 and integrating by parts yield the principal’s objective function
in the relaxed problem as,
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
0 (λ (α,η ;Ξα ))
=EΞα
[ 1
∑
i=0
λ (α ,η;Ξα )
∑
t=1
δ tui,t(θ˜t ,αt(θ˜t))
]
− J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,1 (λ (α,η ;Ξα ),θ1)
−EΞα
[1−F1(θ˜1)
f1(θ˜1)
λ (α ,η;Ξα)
∑
t=1
δ t
∂u1,t(r,αt (θ˜t))
∂ r
∣∣
r=θ˜t
G1,t(h
θ˜
1,t)
]
.
(47)
Since the problem here is finite-time horizon, τ¯ exists. However, stopping rule
problems generally do not have closed form solutions and approaches of approxima-
tion must be used. The general approach of the computation of τ¯ (interested reader
may refer to Jaskowski and van Dijk [2016]) and the corresponding involvements in
the optimization process are not the scope of this paper.
Lemma 9 Suppose that the utility functions ui,t is non-decreasing in the state θt , for
all i = 0, 1, t ∈ T. Under Assumption 2, J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t is a non-decreasing function of θt
for all t ∈ T.
Proof. See Appendix H.
To illustrate the theoretical results, we consider a simple seller-buyer problem,
in which the seller is the principal and the buyer is the agent. The seller-buyer re-
lationship lasts for at most T = 2 periods and the buyer can quit at any period. The
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allocation at is the product the seller offers at period t and the payment pt is the pay-
ment. At the beginning of each period t, the realized state θt represents the buyer’s
preference over the product the seller is going to offer. Suppose that the initial state
θ1 is uniformly distributed over [0,1]with f1(θ1) = 1 and F1(θ1) = θ1. Let c1 ∈ (0,1)
and let c2, c3,c4 ∈ R++. Consider that the buyer’s state evolves as follows:
θt = c1θt−1+ c2at−1+ωt .
where ω2 is uniformly distributed over [0,1]. Let the participants’ utilities be given
by
u0,t(θt ,at) =− c3a
2
t +θt ,
u1,t(θt ,at) =(c4+θt)at .
It is straightforward to see that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied.
Here, u1,t is non-decreasing in θt . From Lemma 9, we have J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t is non-
decreasing of θt . Thus, if we force J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,1 (λ (α,η ;Ξα ),θ 1) = 0, then the RP con-
straint (46) is satisfied and the principal’s objective function in (47) becomes
J
α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ
0 (λ (α,η ;Ξα )) =E
Ξα
[ 1
∑
i=0
λ (α ,η;Ξα)
∑
t=1
δ tui,t(θ˜t ,αt(θ˜t ))
]
−EΞα
[1−F1(θ˜1)
f1(θ˜1)
λ (α ,η;Ξα)
∑
t=1
δ t
∂u1,t(r,αt (θ˜t))
∂ r
∣∣
r=θ˜t
G1,t(h
θ˜
1,t)
]
.
(48)
Next, we describe the optimal mechanism for T = 2, with c1 = c2 = c3 =
1
2
and c4 = 1
with δ = 1. When the choice of η leads to λ (α,η ;Ξα) = 2, the optimal allocation
rule α∗ are given by
α∗1 (θ1) =
10
3
θ1+
4
3
, α∗2 (θ2) = θ2+
1
2
θ1+
1
2
. (49)
Fix θε,1 = θε,2 = 0. The payment rules are given as follow:
φ∗1 (θ1) =
[
α∗1 (θ1)+
1
2
E
α |θ1
[
α∗2 (θ˜2)
]]
θ1−E
α |θ1
[
α∗2 (θ˜2)θ˜2
]
− (1+θ1)α
∗
1 (θ1),
(50)
ξ ∗1 (θ1) =−α
∗
1 (θ1), ξ
∗
2 (θ2) =−α
∗
2 (θ2), (51)
and
ρ∗(1) =
[
α∗1 (η(1))+
1
2
E
α |η(1)
[
α∗2 (θ˜2)
]]
η(1)−α∗1 (η(1))η(1),
ρ∗(2) = 0,
(52)
for any η(1) ∈Θ1. when the choice of η leads to λ (α,η ;Ξα ) = 1, the optimal allo-
cation rule is given by
α∗1 (θt ) = 2θ1.
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andα∗2 can be any (non-negative) allocation rule such that the potential functions con-
structed in Proposition 3 satisfy the inequalities in Proposition 1. The corresponding
optimal payment rules are constructed as
ξ ∗1 (θt ) =−α
∗
1 (θt), (53)
and ξ ∗2 (θt) is constructed in Proposition 1 in terms of α
∗
1 and α
∗
2 , and ρ
∗ is given in
(52).
7 Conclusion
This work focuses on the characterizations of the incentive compatibility of a finite-
horizon dynamic mechanism design problem, in which the agent has the right to
stop the mechanism at any period. We have solved an optimal stopping time problem
under this dynamic environment for the agent to optimally select the time of stop-
ping. A state-independent payment rule has been introduced that delivers a payment
only at the realized stopping time. This payment rule enables the principal to directly
influence the realization of the agent’s stopping time. We have also shown that un-
der certain conditions, the optimal stopping problem can be fully represented by a
threshold rule. Incentive compatibility has been defined in terms of Bellman equa-
tions. A one-shot deviation principle has been established to address the complexity
from the dynamic nature of the environment and the coupling of agent’s reporting
choices and stopping decisions. By relying on a set of formulations characterized by
the non-monetary allocation rule, the formulations we call potential functions, we
have constructed the payment rules to obtain the sufficiency argument of the incen-
tive compatibility for the dynamic environment. The quasilinear payoff formulation
enables us to derive a necessary condition for incentive compatibility from the enve-
lope theorem, which determines the explicit formulation of the potential functions.
These settings naturally lead to the revenue equivalence.
Our analysis provides design regimes for optimal direct mechanism in general
quasilinear dynamic environments when the incentive compatibility takes into ac-
count not only the agent’s reporting behaviors but also his stopping decisions. From
the necessary and the sufficient conditions, we can design the state-independent ter-
minal payment rule by the allocation rule and the threshold function. As a result, the
expected first-passage time (i.e., the expected time-horizon of the principal’s ex-ante
expected payoff) seen at the ex-ante stage is fully determined by the allocation rule
and the threshold function given the transition kernels of the state. We have described
the principal’s optimal mechanism design by applying a class of relaxation approach
that reformulates the principal’s objective function by making the mechanism satisfy
the necessary condition. Hence, the principal’s optimization problem can be handled
by finding the optimal allocation rule and the optimal threshold function. A regular
condition is described to provide a design principle for the state-independent payment
rule. Due to the analytical intractability, however, we have chosen instead to focus on
the case when the threshold function is given with the corresponding expected first-
passage time of the ex-ante stage. A numerical example of a seller-buyer problem has
been shown to illustrate the optimal mechanism design.
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The extension to multiple-agent environments should be our natural next step. In
environmentswith multiple agents, allowing early exit of each agent leads to dynamic
population over time, which is state-dependent. The relationships between population
and individual payoffs could complicate the analysis of incentive compatibility. Other
nontrivial extensions could introduce arrivals of new agents whose incentive to par-
ticipation is characterized by both rational participation constraints provided by the
principal as well as the history of the mechanism.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof of the only if part directly follows from the optimality of truthful reporting and here we provide
the proof for the if part. Suppose, on the contrary, the truthful reporting strategy σ∗ satisfies (16) and (17)
but not (14) and (15). Then there exists a reporting strategy σ ′ and a state θt , at period t ∈ T, such that
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ;σ
′) > V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ;σ
∗). Suppose the optimal stopping rule with σ∗ calls for stopping and the
agent decides to continue by using σ ′, i.e.,
J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt)< E
Ξα;σ ′ [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
.
We can find some ε > 0 such that
E
Ξα;σ ′ [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
≥ J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt )+2ε . (54)
Let σ ′′ be the reporting strategy such that if σ ′′ and σ ′ have the same reporting strategies from period t to
t+ k, for some k ≥ 0, then
E
Ξα;σ ′′ [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
≥ EΞα;σ ′ [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
− ε . (55)
From (54) and (55), we have
E
Ξα;σ ′′ [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
≥ J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt )+ ε . (56)
Here, (56) implies that any deviation(s) for the periods from t to t + k (reporting truthfully for all other
periods) is enough to improve the value V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t .
Let σˆ s be the reporting strategy that differs only at period s from σ∗ and σˆ ss = σ
′′
s , for s ∈ [t,t + k].
Then, we have
E
Ξ
α;σˆt+k−1
[hθt ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
> J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt ). (57)
Now, we look at period t+ k−1. Because, σ∗ satisfies (16) and (17), we have, for all θt+k−1 ∈Θt+k−1,
E
Ξ
α;σˆt+k−2
[hθ
t+k−1]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+k−1 (θt+k−1)
]
=V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+k−1 (θt+k−1)
≥max
(
J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t+k−1(t+ k−1,θt+k−1, σˆ
t+k−1
t+k−1 (θt+k−1)|h
θ
t+k−2)
,E
Ξ
α;σˆt+k−1
[hθ
t+k−1]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+k (θ˜t+k)
])
=V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+k−1 (θt+k−1; σˆ
t+k−1
t+k−1 ).
(58)
Then,
E
Ξ
α;σˆt+k−2
[hθt ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
≥ E
Ξ
α;σˆt+k−1
[hθt ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
. (59)
From (57) and (59), we have
E
Ξ
α;σˆt+k−2
[hθt ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
> J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt ).
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Backward induction yields
E
Ξα;σˆt [h
θ
t ]
[
V
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t+1 (θ˜t+1)
]
> J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t,θt ),
which contradicts the fact that σ∗ satisfies (16) and (17).
Following the similar analysis we can prove the case when the optimal stopping rule with truthful
σ∗ (1) calls for stopping and the agent decides to stop; (2) calls for continuing and the agent decides to
continue; (3) calls for continuing and the agent decides to stop.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Here we prove (20). The establishment of (21) can be proven in the similar way. For any τ ∈T, the agent’s
ex-ante expected payoff (2) can be written as
J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (τ) =E
Ξα
[
τ−1
∑
t=1
[
δ t+1
[
u1,t(θ˜t+1,αt+1(θ˜t+1))+ξt+1(θ˜t+1)
]
+ρ(t+1)
+δ t
[
φt(θ˜t)−ξt(θ˜t)
]
−ρ(t)
]
+δ
[
u1,1(θ˜1,α1(θ˜1))+ξ1(θ˜1)]+ρ(1)
]
.
From law of total expectation, we have
J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (τ) =E
Ξα
[
τ−1
∑
t=1
[
E
α;θt
[
δ t+1
[
u1,t(θ˜t+1,αt+1(θ˜t+1))+ξt+1(θ˜t+1)
]
+ρ(t+1)
+δ t
[
φt(θ˜t)−ξt(θ˜t)
]]
−ρ(t)
]
+δ
[
u1,1(θ˜1,α1(θ˜1))+ξ1(θ˜1)]+ρ(1)
]
=EΞα
[ τ−1
∑
s=0
L
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
s (θ˜s)−ρ(s)
]
+ J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (0).
C Proof of Lemma 5
Let τη denote the optimal stopping time given the threshold function η . Suppose there are two thresholds
η and η ′, with η 6= η ′. such that τη = τη ′ . Without loss of generality, suppose η(t)< η
′(t) for some t ∈T.
Here, we obtain
Pr(τη = t) = Pr(θt ≤ η(t),τη > t−1) =E
Ξα
[
E
α|θt−1
[
1{θ˜t≤η(t)}
]
1{τη>t−1}
]
.
We obtain Pr(τη ′ = t) in a similar way. Then,
Pr(τη ′ = t)−Pr(τη = t)
=EΞα
[
E
α|θt−1
[
1{θ˜t≤η ′(t)}
]
1{τη ′>t−1}
]
−EΞα
[
E
α|θt−1
[
1{θ˜t≤η(t)}
]
1{τη>t−1}
]
= EΞα
[
E
α|θt−1
[
1{η(t)≤θ˜t≤η ′(t)}
]
1τη>t−1
]
.
(60)
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Since τη = τη ′ , the probabilities Pr(τη ′ = t) and Pr(τη = t) are equal, i.e., (60) equals 0. However, As-
sumption 1 yields Eα|θt−1
[
1{η(t)≤θ˜t≤η ′(t)}
]
> 0 and Pr(τη > t−1)> 0, which implies that
E
Ξα
[
E
α|θt−1
[
1{η(t)≤θ˜t≤η ′(t)}
]
1τη>t−1
]
> 0.
This contradiction implies that η is unique.
D Proof of Lemma 6
Let τˆ = inf{t ′ ∈ T|θt′ ∈ Λ
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t′
(t ′)}. Suppose at period t, the realized state θt ∈ Λ
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (t). Thus, the
agent stops at t optimally. Since {α ,φ ,ξ ,ρ} implements τˆ , we obtain, for every θˆt ≤ θt ,
ρ(t)≥ µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt)≥ µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θˆt),
where the inequality is due to Lemma 4. Therefore, θˆt ∈ Λ1,t(t) for every θˆt ≤ θt , which implies that
Λ
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (t) is an interval left-bounded by θ t . Since L
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t is continuous, Λ
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (t) is closed. Thus,
there exists some η(t) ∈Θt such that Λ
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1 (t) = [θ t ,η(t)].
E Proof of Lemma 8
The formulation (38) is obtained by applying envelope theorem and backward induction. Let pit : Θt−1×
At−1→ ∆ (At) such that pit(at |θt−1,at−1) is the probability distribution of at =αt (θt) conditioning on θt−1
and at−1. Clearly, both Ft(θt |θt−1,at−1) and pit (at |θt−1,at−1) are two functions of θs for all s≤ t, s ∈ T.
Let Θt,τ ≡ ∪
τ
s=tΘs. Fix τ ∈ T.
For τ > t, from the definition of expectation, we have
U
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (τ ,θt |h
θ
t−1) =δ
t
[
u1,t(θt ,at )+φt(θt)
]
+ρ(t)
+
∫
Θt+1,τ
[[ τ−1
∑
s=t
L
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
s (θ˜s)−ρ(s)
]]
·
τ
∏
s=t+1
dFs(θ˜s|θ˜s−1, a˜s−1)
τ
∏
s=t
dpis(a˜s|θ˜s−1, a˜s−1).
By applying the envelope theorem and integrating by parts, we obtain the following due to the product
rule,
∂U
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (τ ,r|h
θ
t−1)
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θt
= Eα|θt
[
τ
∑
s=t
∂u1,s(r,αs(θ˜s))
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θt
−
τ
∑
s=t+1
∫
Θs
∂U
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
s (τ ,r|h
θ˜s−1 )
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θ˜s
∂Fs(θ˜s)|θ˜s−1, a˜s−1
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θt
dθ˜s
]
.
At t = τ ,
∂U
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (τ ,r|h
θ
t−1)
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θt
=
∂u1,τ (r,ατ (θ˜τ ))
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θτ
.
Applying backward induction yields (38).
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F Proof of Proposition 1 and 3
Propositions 1 and 3 together form the necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility. We
show the proofs together here. Fix an arbitrary θˆε,t ∈Θε . We discuss the following two cases:
1. θt ∈Λt(t) :
– Necessity (⇒)
Let θˆt ∈Λt(t). Without loss of generality, assume θˆt ≤ θt . Let θ , θ
1, θ 2 ∈ Θ¯t ≡ [θˆt ,θt ].
Since α is IC implementable, there exists ξ such that
δ t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt (θt))+ξt(θt)
]
+ρ(t)≥ δ t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt (θˆt))+ξt(θˆt)
]
+ρ(t). (61)
Define
Bt(θ )≡max
x∈Θ¯t
δ t
[
u1,t(θ ,αt(x))+ξt(x)
]
. (62)
IC implementability implies that
θ ∈ argmax
x∈θ¯t
δ t
[
u1,t(θ ,αt(x))+ξt(x)
]
.
Then, we obtain
|Bt (θ
2)−Bt(θ
1)| ≤max
x∈Θ¯t
δ t
∣∣u1,t(θ 2,αt (x))−u1,t(θ 1,αt (x))∣∣
=max
x∈Θ¯t
δ t
∣∣∣∫ θ2
θ1
∂u1,t(y,αt (x))
∂y
∣∣
y=θ
dθ
∣∣∣
=max
x∈Θ¯t
δ t
∣∣∣β αS,t (θ 2)−β αS,t(θ 1)∣∣∣.
By Assumption 5, we have that Bt is Lipschitz continuous. Thus, Bt is differentiable almost everywhere.
Therefore, we have
Bt(θt)−Bt(θˆt) =
∫ θt
θˆt
dBt(y)
dy
∣∣
y=θ
dθ .
Applying envelope theorem to Bt yields
dBt (y)
dy
∣∣
y=θ
=
∂
∂x
[
δ tu1,t(x,αt (θ ))+ξt(θ )
]∣∣∣
x=θ
=
∂
∂x
δ tu1,t (x,αt (θ ))
∣∣∣
x=θ
=γαt (t,θ |h
θ
t−1).
Therefore, we have
β αS,t (θt)−β
α
S,t(θˆt) =Bt(θt)−Bt(θˆt)
=δ t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt (θt))+ξt(θt)
]
−δ t
[
u1,t(θˆt ,αt (θˆt))+ξt(θˆt)
]
From the definition of ℓS,t(θt , θˆt), we have
ℓS,t (θt , θˆt )
=δ tu1,t (θt ,αt (θt))−δ
tu1,t(θˆt ,αt(θt))
=δ tu1,t (θt ,αt (θt))−δ
tu1,t(θˆt ,αt(θˆt))+δ
tu1,t(θˆt ,αt (θˆt))−δ
tu1,t(θˆt ,αt (θt))
≥δ t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt(θt))−u1,t(θˆt ,αt (θˆt))+ξt(θt)−ξt(θˆt)
]
=β αS,t (θt)−β
α
S,t(θˆt).
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– Sufficiency (⇐)
From the construction of ξ in 1, we have, for all θt , θˆt ∈Θt ,
ξt(θt)−ξt(θˆt) =δ
−t
[
β αS,t (θt)−β
α
S,t (θˆt)
]
−u1,t(θt ,αt (θt))+u1,t(θˆt ,αt(θˆt)).
Since β αtS,t (θt)−β
α
S,t (θˆt)≤ ℓS,t(θt , θˆt), we obtain
δ t
[
ξt(θt)−ξt(θˆt)
]
≤δ t
[
u1,t(θˆt ,αt (θˆt))−u1,t(θˆt ,αt (θt))
]
,
which gives
δ t
[
u1,t(θˆt ,αt (θˆt))+ξt(θˆt)
]
+ρ(t)≥ δ t
[
u1,t(θˆt ,αt (θt))+ξt(θt)
]
+ρ(t),
i.e., α is IC implementable.
2. θt 6∈Λt(t) :
– Necessity (⇒)
Similar to the case when θt ∈Λt(t), IC implementability implies the existence of φ and ξs such that
δ t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt (θt))+ξt(θt)
]
+ µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt)
≥δ t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt(θˆt))+ξt(θˆt)
]
+ µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt , θˆt ).
Define
B′t(θ )≡max
x∈Θ¯t
[
δ t
[
u1,t(θ ,αt(x))+ξt(x)
]
+ µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θ ,x)
]
. (63)
IC implementability implies that
θ ∈ argmax
x∈Θ¯t
[
δ t
[
u1,t(θ ,αt(x))+ξt(x)
]
+ µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θ ,x)
]
.
Next, we observe that
|B′t(θ
2)−B′t(θ
1)|
≤max
x∈Θ¯t
∣∣∣δ tu1,t(θ 2,αt (x))+ µ¯α,φ ,ξ ,ρt (θ 2,x)−δ tu1,t(θ 1,αt (x))− µ¯α,φ ,ξ ,ρt (θ 1,x)∣∣∣
=max
x∈Θ¯t
∣∣∣Eα|θ2 ,x[ sup
τ∈Tt
{∫ θ2
θˆε,t
γαt (τ ,r,x|h
θ
t−1)dr
}]
−Eα|θ
2 ,x
[
sup
τ∈Tt
{∫ θ1
θˆε,t
γαt (τ ,r,x|h
θ
t−1)dr
}]
=max
x∈θ¯t
∣∣∣β αS¯,t(θ 2)−β αS¯,t(θ 1)
∣∣∣.
Thus, B′t is also Lipschitz continuous. Thus, B
′
t is differentiable almost everywhere. Therefore, we have
(by applying envelope theorem as in the case of θt ∈Λ1,t(t)).
β α
S¯,t
(θt)−β
α
S¯,t
(θˆt) =B
′
t(θt)−B
′
t(θˆt)
=δ t
[
u1,t(θt ,αt(θt))+ξt(θt)
]
+ µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt)
−δ t
[
u1,t(θˆt ,αt (θˆt))+ξt(θˆt)
]
− µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θˆt).
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Then,
sup
τ∈Tt
{
ℓS¯,t(θt , θˆt ;τ)
}
= sup
τ∈Tt
{
E
α|θt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))+ξτ (θ˜τ)
]]
−Eα|θˆt ,θt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))+ξτ(θ˜τ )
]]}
= sup
τ∈Tt
{
E
α|θt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))+ξτ (θ˜τ)
]]
−Eα|θˆt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))+ξτ (θ˜τ)
]]
+Eα|θˆt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))+ξτ (θ˜τ)
]]
−Eα|θˆt ,θt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))+ξτ(θ˜τ )
]]}
From IC implementability, we have
sup
τ∈Tt
{
ℓα;θt ,θˆt
S¯,t
(θt , θˆt ;τ)
}
≥ sup
τ∈Tt
{
E
α|θt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))+ξτ(θ˜τ )
]]
−Eα|θˆt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
[
u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))+ξτ(θ˜τ )
]]
+Eα|θˆt ,θt
[ τ−1
∑
s=t
δ sφs(θ˜s)
]
−Eα|θˆt
[ τ−1
∑
s=t
δ sφs(θ˜s)
]}
.
Substituting the formulations of φ and ξ given in (31) and (32), respectively, and using the fact β α
S¯,t
(θt)≥
β αS,t (θt) yield
sup
τ∈Tt
{
ℓS¯,t(θt , θˆt ;τ)
}
≥ β α
S¯,t
(θt)−β
α
S¯,t
(θˆt).
– Sufficiency (⇐)
From the constructions of φ and ξ given in (31) and (32), respectively, we have (for simplicity, we
use u1,s to denote u1,s(θ˜s,αs(θ˜s)))
µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt , θˆt )+δ
t
[
u1,t(θt , θˆt )+ξt(θˆt)
]
= sup
τ∈Tt
[
E
α|θt ,θˆt
[ τ−1
∑
s=t+1
L
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
s (θ˜s,αs(θ˜s))−ρ(s)
]]
+L
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt ,αt (θˆt))+δ
t [u1,t (θt ,αt (θˆt))+ξt(θˆt)]
=sup
τ≥t
[
E
α|θt ,θˆt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
(
u1,s+ξs(θ˜)
)
+
τ−1
∑
s=t
δ s
[
φs(θ˜s)−ξs(θ˜s)
]]
+
τ−1
∑
s=t
[
ρ(s+1)−ρ(s)
]
+ρ(t)
]
=sup
τ≥t
[
E
α|θt ,θˆt
[ τ
∑
s=t
δ s
(
u1,s+ξs(θ˜s)
)
+
τ−1
∑
s=t
δ s
[
φs(θ˜s)−ξs(θ˜s)
]]
+ρ(τ)
]
=sup
τ≥t
[
E
α|θt ,θˆt
{[ τ
∑
s=t
δ su1,s+δ
τ ξτ (θ˜τ )
]
+
τ−1
∑
s=t
δ sφs(θ˜s)
}
+ρ(τ)
]
=sup
τ≥t
[
E
α|θt ,θˆt
{[ τ
∑
s=t
δ su1,s+δ
τ ξτ (θ˜τ )
]}
+β α
S¯,t
(θˆt)
−Eα|θˆt
[
β α
S¯,τ
(θ˜τ)+
τ−1
∑
s=t
u1,s
]
+ρ(τ)
]
.
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From the definition of length functions and inequalities of the potential functions in Proposition 1, we
have
µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt , θˆt)+δ
t
[
u1,t(θt , θˆt)+ξt(θˆt)
]
≤β α
S¯,t
(θˆt)− ℓ
α;θˆt ,θt
S¯,t
(θˆt ,θt)+ sup
τ≥t
[
ρ(τ)
]
≤ β α
S¯,t
(θt)+ sup
τ≥t
[
ρ(τ)
]
=β α
S¯,t
(θt)+ sup
τ≥t
[
ρ(τ)
]
=µ¯
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (θt)+δ
t
[
u1,t(θt)+ξt(θt)
]
,
i.e., α is IC implementable.
G Proof of Proposition 4
Let θ aε,t , θ
b
ε,t ∈Θ associate with β
α;a
S¯,t
and β α;b
S¯,t
, respectively. For any period t ∈T\{1}, time horizon τ ∈T,
J
α,φa,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ ,θt |h
θ
t−1)− J
α,φa ,ξ ,ρ
1,t−1 (τ ,θt−1|h
θ
t−2)
=J
α,φa ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ ,θt |h
θ
t−1)−E
Ft (θt−1,at−1)
[
J
α,φa ,ξ ,ρ
1,t−1 (τ , θ˜t |h
θ
t−2)
]
=EFt (θt−1 ,at−1)
[
J
α,φa ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ ,θt |h
θ
t−1)− J
α,φa ,ξ ,ρ
1,t−1 (τ , θ˜t |h
θ
t−1)
]
=EFt (θt−1 ,at−1)
[∫ θt
θaε,t
γαt−1(τ ,r|h
θ
t−2)dr−
∫ θ˜t
θaε,t
γαt−1(τ ,r|h
θ
t−2)dr
]
=EFt (θt−1 ,at−1)
[∫ θt
θ˜t
γαt−1(τ ,r|h
θ
t−2)dr
]
=EFt (θt−1 ,at−1)
[∫ θt
θbε,t
γαt−1(τ ,r|h
θ
t−2)dr−
∫ θ˜t
θbε,t
γαt−1(τ ,r|h
θ
t−2)dr
]
=J
α,φb ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ ,θt |h
θ
t−1)− J
α,φb ,ξ ,ρ
1,t−1 (τ ,θt−1|h
θ
t−2).
(64)
Hence, we have
E
α|θt
[ τ
∑
s=0
δ sφas (θ˜s)+ξ
a
τ (θ˜τ )+ρ
a(τ)
]
−Eα|θt
[ τ
∑
s=0
δ sφbs (θ˜s)+ξ
b
τ (θ˜τ )+ρ
b(τ)
]
=Eα|θt−1
[ τ
∑
s=0
δ sφas (θ˜s)+ξ
a
τ (θ˜τ )+ρ
a(τ)
]
−Eα|θt−1
[ τ
∑
s=0
δ sφbs (θ˜s)+ξ
b
τ (θ˜τ )+ρ
b(τ)
]
.
(65)
Induction gives the following
E
α|θt
[ τ
∑
s=0
δ sφas (θ˜s)+ξ
a
τ (θ˜τ)+ρ
a(τ)
]
−Eα|θt
[ τ
∑
s=0
δ sφbs (θ˜s)+ξ
b
τ (θ˜τ )+ρ
b(τ)
]
=EΞα
[ τ
∑
s=0
δ sφas (θ˜s)+ξ
a
τ (θ˜τ)+ρ
a(τ)
]
−EΞα
[ τ
∑
s=0
δ sφbs (θ˜s)+ξ
b
τ (θ˜τ )+ρ
b(τ)
]
=Cτ .
(66)
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H Proof of Lemma 9
It is easy to obtain that
∂J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ ,r|h
θ
t−1)
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θt
=
∂U
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
t (τ ,r|h
θ
t−1)
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θt
=Eα|θt
[ τ
∑
s=t
∂u1,s(r,αs(θ˜s))
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θ˜s
Gt,s(h
θ˜
t,s)
]
.
FromAssumption 2, we haveGt,s(h
θ˜
t,s)≥ 0. Since u1,t is a non-decreasing function of θt ,
∂J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ,r|h
θ
t−1)
∂ r
∣∣∣
r=θt
≥
0. Therefore, J
α,φ ,ξ ,ρ
1,t (τ ,r|h
θ
t−1) is a non-decreasing function of θt , for all t ∈ T.
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